The Johnson-McConnell Agreement of 1966 led to the end of the United States Army's fixed wing tactical aviation units. Since then the Army has been left with helicopters as its sole army aviation assets, although they do retain the right to operate certain other aircraft. Fixed wing aircraft with an empty weight of up to 5,000 pounds are usable for utility and observation tasks under the Pace-Finletter MOU 1952 (it doesn't say they can't be carrying out armed reconnaissance) and the status of VTOL aircraft was left undetermined in the Johnson-McConnell Agreement. That means the United States Army could operate aircraft such as the North American Rockwell OV-10 Bronco or the Cessna A-37 Dragonfly during the 1960s (both are several hundred pounds overweight, but the Folland Gnat might be an option) and the Embraer A-29 Super Tucano in modern times. It also means the Army could operate VTOL aircraft, and the Army was actually one of the most extensive testers of the Hawker Siddeley P.1127 Kestrel, which later evolved into the Harrier. What kind of point of divergence after the creation of United States Air Force might see the United States Army utilize its fixed wing aviation and VTOL rights to build its own force for close air support, or even see it acquire air capabilities similar to the United States Marine Corps such as multirole aircraft (F-4s, F/A-18s, Harriers, etc.) and tactical airlift capabilities (C-130s)?